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ANTITRUST
In American Oil Co. v. McMullin, the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered whether a consignment contract was violative of the Sher-
man Act' and concluded that the particular contract was not.
Early in 1967, American Oil Co. (American) entered into a
contractual relationship with Lawrence McMullin whereby
McMullin was to operate a bulk distribution plant, a service
station, and a cafe owned by American.' He was designated in the
contract as an "employee-agent of American" in the operation of
the distribution plant and "was treated as an independent
dealer" with regard to the service station and cafe, for which he
paid a monthly rental.4 The parties continued in this relationship
for over 2 years, but McMullin was beset with financial difficul-
ties from the outset which ultimately left him unable to meet his
tax obligations and deeply in debt to American.5
American terminated the relationship and brought suit
against McMullin to recover from him the money he owed the
company.6 McMullin counterclaimed and alleged monopolization
- 508 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1975).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Sherman Act].
' 508 F.2d at 1347. McMullin was required to make an initial investment of $10,000,
and he assumed operation of the facilities after receiving training from American. McMul-
lin entered into a standard lease agreement with American by virtue of which he became
"the lessee of all of the Elko facilities, including the truck stop, the cafe, the bulk distribu-
tion point, and all buildings, tanks, pumps, and other fixtures." Id. The rental for this
was a charge on all gasoline sold and a percentage of the gross receipts from the restaurant
operation. Under the bulk sales arrangement, "McMullin was compensated by a commis-
sion on all bulk plant sales" and "American retained ownership and risk of loss as to all
products at the plant." Id. American retained the right to establish bulk plant prices and
limited the geographical area in which the products could be sold. McMullin, however,
was given the right to hire additional employees at his own expense and to extend credit
to other customers at his own risk.
The remaining contracts dealt with the service station, which was the only American
brand station in the area. While McMullin was "treated as an independent dealer with
the latitude to set his own retail prices," the physical arrangement was such that access
to the service station's fuel tanks was attainable only through the bulk distribution point.
Id. McMullin participated in a variety of programs with American and the initial financ-
ing was provided by the oil company.
'Id.
The financial difficulties were caused by McMullin's limited marketing position,
uncontrolled costs, and his being "badly undercapitalized." Id. at 1348.
' The various claims on which American recovered $121,407.38 included a tax lien it
paid for McMullin, money owed by McMullin for sales from the bulk plant to his own
facilities, credit sales, and expenses connected with an attachment proceeding. Id. at 1349-
50.
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by American in violation of the Sherman Act. The basis for his
claim was that the relationship between him and American was
a consignment contract similar to that condemned by the Su-
preme Court as violative of the Act' in Simpson v. Union Oil Co.'
In dismissing McMullin's counterclaim, the Tenth Circuit looked
at the substance rather than the form of the relationship between
the parties to conclude that "McMullin was an employee of
American and not an independent businessman."9 Thus, the ar-
rangement was not impermissible under Simpson, because in
that case independent businessmen were involved while in
McMullin the only person involved was an employee of the defen-
dant. The court was unable to find anything "in Simpson which
would prohibit a manufacturer from distributing its own products
and thereby controlling wholesale distribution prices."'"
In Beltronics, Inc. v. Eberline Instrument Corp. I Beltronics
had a 5-year renewable contract under which it was the exclusive
agent for the sale of capacitators made by Eberline Instrument
Corporation (Eberline). These capacitators were sold exclusively
to Western Electric Company (Western), and in 1969 Western
declined to have any further dealings with Eberline if it had to
do so through Beltronics. Consequently, Eberline did not renew
its contract with Beltronics and made other arrangements for the
sale of its capacitators. Beltronics then brought suit against
' The plaintiff alleged that sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act were violated by the
consignment contracts American had McMullin enter into. These sections, in part, pro-
vide that
[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ....
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ....
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
9 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
' In looking at substance rather than form, the Tenth Circuit followed settled law in
determining whether "the scheme ... involved although on its face a bona fide lease and
consignment agreement is actually and in effect 'a resale price maintenance' or 'some
coercive arrangement.'" 2 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS,
AND MONOPOLIES § 11.03 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as CALLMANN], quoting Simpson
v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 17 (1964).
,0 508 F.2d at 1352.
11 509 F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).
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Western and Eberline, and alleged, among other things, a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. 2
Beltronics alleged that the restrictions placed upon Eber-
line's contract with Western violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act within the meaning of United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co. 3 Schwinn, which involved restrictions on the sale of bicycles
by distributors after the manufacturer had parted with dominion,
was held by the Tenth Circuit to be inapplicable because there
was no restriction on competition involved in Beltronics. The
court said, "Eberline purchased cable from Western, used the
cable in making capacitators, and sold the capacitators to West-
ern. In effect Western bought the cable back, albeit in a different
form. Schwinn has no application."' 4 Because all that was in-
volved was "elimination of a non-competing middleman" that
could not "be stretched into a claim of a § 1 . .. violation,""5 the
Tenth Circuit also rejected Beltronics' claim that it was the vic-
tim of a group boycott.
In Board of County Commissioners v. Wilshire Oil Co. " the
Tenth Circuit considered the validity of venue in an antitrust
action 7 brought in the Western District of Oklahoma against a
" Beltronics sued for breach of contract, tortious interference with contractual rela-
tions, and the antitrust violations discussed in the text accompanying notes 18-20 infra.
The district court, in an opinion reported at 369 F. Supp. 295 (D. Colo. 1973), held for
the defendant on all counts, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed both the findings of fact and
the conclusions of law reached by the lower court.
13 388 U.S. 365 (1967). In Schwinn the manufacturer of bicycles assigned specific
territories to each of its 22 distributors who were instructed to sell only to franchised
accounts in their own territories. The Court noted that the case involved "vertical restric-
tions as to territory and dealers." Id. at 372. In Beltronics there was no such vertical
relationship and the two cases are distinguishable on that basis. Spe 16H J. VON KALI-
NOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAW AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 67.02[1]
(1972) [hereinafter cited as VON KALINOWSKI] where the author says that "vertical price
maintenance includes arrangements between the various persons in the chain of distribu-
tion .... "
1' 509 F.2d at 1320.
Is Id.
" 523 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1975).
'7 The sole question involved was whether venue was proper in the Western District
of Oklahoma "in view of the fact that the appellee .. .is a Kansas corporation having
its home office in ...Kansas." Id. at 126-27. The trial court initially held that the
evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that venue was proper. It then held that
while the appellee had transacted business in the Northern District, "this was insufficient
to constitute venue in the Western District of Oklahoma where the suit had been filed."
Id. at 127.
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Kansas corporation which "made assiduous efforts to avoid any
appearance of doing business in Oklahoma."' 8 The trial court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the action on the
grounds that while the contacts may have been sufficient to jus-
tify venue in the Northern District of Oklahoma, they were insuf-
ficient to constitute transaction of business in the Western Dis-
trict of Oklahoma within the meaning of section 22 of the Clayton
Act." In reaching this conclusion, the district court held that the
general venue statutes" were inapplicable and did not supple-
ment the venue requirements of section 22.
In reversing the trial court, the Tenth Circuit first affirmed
the lower court's determination that the defendant's contacts
with the Northern District of Oklahoma were sufficient to consti-
tute transaction of business within the meaning of section 22.21
The court of appeals then applied settled lawn in holding that
"the provisions of the general venue statute supplement all other
special venue statutes. '23 If section 1392(a) were applicable to
this fact situation, then venue would be proper in the Western
Is Id.
Is Venue in antitrust actions is controlled by 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as section 22], which provides as follows:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation
may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant,
but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and
all process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an
inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
(Emphasis added).
" The pertinent section in Wilshire Oil is 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1970) [hereinafter
cited as section 1392(a)], which provides as follows: "Any civil action, not of a local
nature, against defendants residing in different districts in the same State, may be
brought in any of such districts."
*" 523 F.2d at 129. In reaching this decision the Tenth Circuit relied on United States
v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795 (1948), which the appellate court said "holds that in
determining whether a corporation is transacting business within a district, practical
business conceptions are to be considered rather than hair-splitting legal technicalities."
523 F.2d at 128. Therefore, the fact that asphalt produced in Kansas was being regularly
sold and used in Kansas meant that the corporation was transacting business in Oklahoma
even though the transactions were technically completed in Kansas. See also B.J. Semel
Associates v. United Fireworks Mfg. Co., 355 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1965); McCrory Corp.
v. Cloth World, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Fashion Two Twenty, Inc. v.
Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.,
308 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. 111. 1969); Crusader Marine Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp.
802 (E.D. Mich. 1968); United States v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 247 F. Supp. 185
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
" See 523 F.2d at 129-30 nn.4-7.
n Id. at 130.
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District of Oklahoma because that section provides that venue is
proper in "one district if one defendant resides in that district and
another defendant resides in the same state but in another judi-
cial district." 4 The question to be determined, then, was whether
any of the defendants resided in either the Northern or Western
District of Oklahoma within the meaning of section 1392(a).
To determine this question, the appellate court looked at the
purpose of section 1392(a), which "is to prevent two law suits in
different districts within the same state where one suit would
suffice," 25 and the purpose of the Clayton Act, which is to "liber-
alize rather than restrict venue in antitrust actions as far as cor-
porations are concerned." 2 In accomplishing these dual purposes,
the Tenth Circuit held, in effect, that transacting business within
the meaning of section 22 is the functional equivalent of residing
in a district within the meaning of section 1392(a).21 Because one
of the defendants transacted business in the Western District and
two of the defendants transacted business in the Northern Dis-
trict, they resided in both of those districts for the purposes of
section 1392(a). Venue was, therefore, proper in the Western Dis-
trict. By so deciding, the Tenth Circuit has expanded the mean-
ing of the term "residing" in section 1392(a) by holding that the
24 Id.
" Id., citing C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS at 154 (1970). See also Hawks v.
Maryland & Pa. R.R., 90 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
11 523 F.2d at 130, citing United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573
(1948); United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795 (1948); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Southern Photo Material Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
" The court did not deal with the question of whether "reside" was limited to the
three meanings of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970) and, therefore, did not include "transact
business" within the meaning of section 22. Instead of resolving this issue, the court
simply acknowledged that some courts do recognize a difference between the two terms
and held as follows:
We are aware that some courts hold that there is a difference-that fewer
contacts are required in order to transact business than are required in order
to do business.
On the other hand, numerous decisions hold that the two terms are the
same. It is unnecessary, however, for this question to be determined within
the context of the present problem. It is sufficient to hold, which we do, that
§ 1392. . . supplements 15 US. C. § 22. We need not therefore agonize over
whether transacting business and doing business are identical.
523 F.2d at 131 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Compare Friends of Animals, Inc.
v. American Veterinary Ass'n, 310 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), (Ohio-Midland Light &
Power Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 221 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Ohio 1962), with Fashion Two
Twenty, Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), City of Philadelphia v.
Morton Salt Co., 289 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. Pa. 1968), and cases cited in note 38 supra.
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term encompasses transacting business in a district as defined in
section 22.8 The court has achieved a liberal interpretation of
both venue sections by allowing section 1392(a) to supplement
section 22 and by making section 22 amplify the meaning of sec-
tion 1392(a).
In Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp.9 the Tenth Circuit reversed a
$259.5 million judgment0 awarded to Telex by a federal district
court1.3 Telex based its claim on an alleged violation by IBM of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act" and section 2 of the Clayton
Act.3 3 Specifically, Telex charged IBM "with monopolization in
the manufacture, distribution, sale, and leasing of plug compati-
ble products which are attached to IBM central processing
units. '34 The district court first held that there was "a definable
market for all peripheral devices plug compatible with IBM pro-
cessing units" and "individual submarkets for each particular
type of peripheral product. 3 Because IBM was at first the only
manufacturer of peripheral products, it naturally had 100 percent
of the market; however, as other manufacturers entered the mar-
ket, IBM's share of this market eroded. In attempting to prevent
further erosion of its market share, IBM engaged in several acts
36
11 The court also considered the question of whether the fact that the appellee had
ceased doing business as of the filing of the complaint should remove venue from the
Western District of Oklahoma. 523 F.2d at 131. The court held that it did not because
"[the vast weight of authority supports the rule that the crucial time is when the cause
of action arose." It cited authority from the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, as well
as "an indication from the Tenth Circuit that the time when the action arises is
determinative. Id. (footnote omitted).
- 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975). For a more extended analysis of this decision, see
Norgaard, Relevant Market in Computer Monopolization, 53 DENVER L.J. - (1976).
30 The particular elements of damage as found by the district court were as follows:
1. $70 million attributable to loss of market share which the court held
Telex would have retained had it not been for the illegal acts of IBM.
2. $39 million in loss of rental profits.
3. $8.5 million in loss of sales profits.
Id. at 908. These amounts were adjusted and then trebled. The district court awarded IBM
its counterclaim against Telex for misappropriation by Telex of IBM's trade secrets. This
counterclaim was reduced by the court of appeals to $17.5 million and was affirmed. Id.
at 933; see id. at 910-12, 928-33. See also Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, and Unfair
Competition section of the Tenth Circuit Survey.
31 For a discussion of the procedural aspects of this case, see 510 F.2d at 898.
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
- Id. § 13.
11 510 F.2d at 898.
31 Id. at 899.




which the district court concluded were contrary to section 2 of
the Sherman Act in that, by so acting, IBM exercised monopoly
power.
On appeal, IBM first challenged the district court's defini-
tion of what the relevant market included.37 The trial court lim-
ited this market "to peripheral products plug compatible with
IBM central processing units '3 8 while IBM sought a determina-
tion that the relevant product market should include peripheral
devices that are plug compatible with equipment marketed by
other systems manufacturers.39 The basis for the contention by
IBM was that
the "plug compatible" peripheral equipment marketed for use in
one system is the same as that marketed for use in another system,
except for a necessary charge in the "interface." IBM [claimed]
that the cost of modifying an interface so that it can be used with
another system amounts to less than 1% of the product's purchase
price. 0
The court of appeals relied on United States v. E. L du Pont de
Nemours & Co." for the proposition "that if one product may
substitute for another in the market it is 'reasonably interchange-
able.' "42 In Telex, the Tenth Circuit was of the opinion that the
peripheral products of the other manufacturers were reasonably
interchangeable with those manufactured by IBM.4 3 Thus, the
1. Announcement and institution of the 2319A disk storage facility in
September 1970.
2. The announcement of the 2319B disk storage facility in December
1970.
3. The announcement of the Fixed Term Plan long term leasing program
in May 1971.
4. The announcement and implementation of the Extended Term Plan,
which was also a leasing plan, in March 1972.
5. IBM's pricing policies with regard to its memory products during 1970
and 1971.
Id. at 900. For a more extended discussion of these acts, see Norgaard, supra note 29, and
510 F.2d at 900-09.
3 Id. at 912-14.
30 Id. at 914.
3' See id.
, Id. at 912 n.11.
41 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
,1 510 F.2d at 917.
41 The court cited United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966), and said
Grinnell Corp. "recognizes that substitute products are to be included within the defini-
tion of relevant market .... 510 F.2d at 919.
1976
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district court erred in not including them in its definition of a
reasonable market and there could "be no ruling of monopoliza-
tion."4
Charles P. Leder
" Id. The court of appeals also rejected the district court's finding that IBM exercised
illegal monopoly power. The court of appeals noted from the facts presented in Telex that
"IBM did not use monopoly power even if it [were to be] assumed that it had such
power." Id. at 926.
